

Cody

lecture at SAIS

Wayne Smith - can get an audience at SAIS

Kary Biers, dir. of COHA (think tank, lobbying  
Smith on

or anal. at Nat Educ. Assoc.

Daddy Skinn

Woodrow Wilson School -

(SAIS - Earl Ravenel)

Bill Miller - Pres of US- Soviet Relations  
(Cold War - East-West Accord)

SH:

Walter P. Santel

Roy Gantloff

1111 National Press Bldg. Wash DC  
20045



2 Nov 89

Wasego



Boston

London

Moscow

Don't Hoff

Johnson,

Zhenkin

Steinbock

de Mars, Notre Dame

Karejnovu

(Boring Hunt?)

Jervis, NY

Kontinuu

Bant

Smeyers

Prinlow

Rankin

Sagan

mil'stein

Ritchelson

Profundo

Heral

Kokorin

Ravenal

Varignon

da Roquette

Alenxi Ambator

McMichael

4. a. Vanil' yev

Valkonen

Bobkayev

Dobrukhotin

Paul Bunick

Velikovo

Bovine



Continent

Vangel

148. Was CII an example of (Neth-like) <sup>high-</sup> risk-taking?

(see \_\_\_\_\_)

of K? \_\_\_\_\_ or of JFK? (as seen by \_\_\_\_\_)

Did K & Palumbo see high risks?

Should they have, necessarily?

Was K without any basis for his confidence?

(Was it based on a sense of JFK "cowardice,  
weakness"?)

Thus, was Brydner much more cautious?

(What if he had been wrong about Czech, or  
Afghanistan - US reaction?)

To a degree, he was; Conte felt  
"betrayed" — and did react strongly!

vis. CA - Afghanistan?

F. M. A. ?!

(and see Aug 80!) (see 'Crisis')

See Kopf, Ennis, p. 157 - a heads in 1964 of  
US public opinion: gradually committing public  
(+ Pres?) - as I was, by RT!

27 Nov 88

CA as Provocation  
for US action "in retub.", or  
"to support" "allies" ...

CI (Shubert)

<sup>Swift</sup>  
CII (Hissobling; Buck + Sam Wilson  
on Mangoon!)

Centres:

Elbal White Paper - Elbal [<sup>+ Nanta: ship for Elbal -</sup>  
34A! (TG; after ...)

(and to get Res from Congress;

as in CI, purpose of planned attack  
on Guantanamo may have been to commit

Pres - tie JFK's hands...

- ? N's SECRET BOMBING OF CAMBODIA: PROV? AS WELL AS DEMO?

- Persian Gulf strategy?!

See actual use by R of attack on  
Stamps! even though it was by drag! (+ Kuwait?)  
- R - looks for Gulf of Sidra, Tripoli attacks!



Oct 89

Issues:

- Gov. control over military
- Military resistance to NOD, or to least of <sup>conf</sup> counter-offensive  
or to unilateral measures
- This, likelihood of SC unilateral measures toward NOD
- SC attitude toward balance in Europe

and/or toward prospects for offensive

and/or worth of offensive cap.

[ SC unilat. suggests SC demand toward NATO

"options": Munich, Paris... Epstein

on one or both counts (balance, offensive)

though they might have concluded that, although  
they were strong, & stronger (they say this) it would  
worth it, or balance.

7. RFK warning - no warning.

focus on it)

8. Monsoon after Cuba II: - through March 63  
- after " 63-Nov 63  
- 1964

9. P&ACM, + similar restrictions on disarm.

14. Sous: What did K "mean" about JFK -> USG - from Bay of Pigs? <sup>X</sup> <sup>winner!</sup> <sup>Vain?</sup>  
Wall? Malpatria? <sup>B-1</sup> <sup>Feb 25?</sup>  
Monsoon? <sup>(X)</sup>

38' Jan-B-1  
win 8 '63

10. (Sous): What K planned for Berlin,  
if missiles remained? What was his aim, needs, or thing?  
also - (Khan was?)

11. Sous: What K would have done, in Berlin or Germany <sup>(X)</sup>  
<sup>not first, planned</sup>  
if missiles struck; or if invasion.  
<sup>SCHLES, RFK 5/12</sup>

US: What would <sup>P 23</sup>  
JFK have done -

if missiles not  
disarmed, till  
"operation"? <sup>(X)</sup>

12. Sous: What was intent of warnings & assess on  
Berlin and on election; and thing of prophet  
(was election? To invasion from?) <sup>WHY NOT SAHS FIRST?</sup>  
<sup>(WHAT WAS RUSH?)</sup>

13. Sous: Did offer of a private deal on IRBMS have any effect  
at the time? Help later? <sup>(X)</sup>

WHY WARHEADS  
SENT?

45, 274-75